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TLS private keys were previously not sanitised in logs

High
jamietanna published GHSA-4hmw-qw74-vrhm Aug 27, 2026

Package

docker docker.io/mend/renovate-ce (docker)

Affected versions

<15.4.0

Patched versions

15.4.0
docker docker.io/mend/renovate-ee-server (docker)
<15.4.0
15.4.0
docker docker.io/mend/renovate-ee-worker (docker)
<15.4.0
15.4.0
docker docker.io/renovate/renovate (docker)
<44.14.44
44.14.4
helm ghcr.io/mend/charts/mend-renovate-ce (helm)
<15.4.0
15.4.0
helm ghcr.io/mend/charts/mend-renovate-enterprise-edition (helm)
<10.4.0
10.4.0
docker ghcr.io/mend/renovate-ce (docker)
<15.4.0
15.4.0
docker ghcr.io/mend/renovate-ee-server (docker)
<15.4.0
15.4.0
docker ghcr.io/mend/renovate-ee-worker (docker)
<15.4.0
15.4.0
docker ghcr.io/renovate/renovate (docker)
<44.14.44
44.14.4
helm mend-renovate-ce (helm)
<15.4.0
15.4.0
helm mend-renovate-enterprise-edition (helm)
<10.4.0
10.4.0
docker mend/renovate-ce (docker)
<15.4.0
15.4.0
docker mend/renovate-ee-server (docker)
<15.4.0
15.4.0
docker mend/renovate-ee-worker (docker)
<15.4.0
15.4.0
npm renovate (npm)
<44.14.44
44.14.4
docker renovate/renovate (docker)
<44.14.44
44.14.4

Description

Summary

Renovate previously had a gap in its log sanitisation for TLS private keys used for Mutual TLS.

When configuring a Host Rule that requires a TLS certificate (when performing Mutual TLS), Renovate sanitises the httpsPrivateKey log line, such as:

DEBUG: File config
       "config": {
         "hostRules": [{"matchHost": "example.com", "httpsPrivateKey": "***********"}]
       }

However, if that full key was referenced in another field (whether another config option, or outputted in a log message with a key that was not httpsPrivateKey) it may have logged the full value.

For instance, with a very contrived example:

module.exports = {
	hostRules: [
		{
			matchHost: 'example.com',
            // NOT the correct handling: you should be passing these `secrets`
			httpsPrivateKey: 'BEGIN PRIVATE KEY',
		},
	],
	// contrived example to show the issue, which is NOT correctly handling a secret
	username: 'BEGIN PRIVATE KEY',
}

This would then log i.e.:

DEBUG: Platform config
       "platformConfig": {
         "hostType": "github",
         "endpoint": "https://api.github.com/",
         "isGHApp": false,
         "isGhe": false,
         "isGheCloud": false,
         "userDetails": {
           "username": "jamietanna",
           "name": "Jamie Tanna",
           "id": 3315059,
           "email": null
         },
         "userEmail": null
       },
       "renovateUsername": "BEGIN PRIVATE KEY"

Renovate previously would not sanitise this correctly.

This is somewhat expected for users who are not following the documented recommendations to pass secrets through the secrets configuration.

However, we have fixed this to ensure that any values put into hostRules[].httpsPrivateKey will be redacted anywhere they're found in Renovate's logs.

Impact

  • If you are using Mutual TLS
  • If you are configuring it through hostRules[].httpsPrivateKey
  • If you are not following documented best practices to pass secrets through the secrets configuration
  • If Renovate logs:
    • A field that is not literally called httpsPrivateKey
    • That field is referencing the full secret value

Patches

This is patched in Renovate 44.14.4.

Workarounds

Manage secrets through secrets, such as:

module.exports = {
	secrets: {
        
		FOO: 'BEGIN PRIVATE KEY',
	},
	hostRules: [
		{
			matchHost: 'example.com',
            // correct handling
			httpsPrivateKey: '{{ secrets.FOO }}',
		},
	],
	// incorrectly handled, but will be sanitised
	username: 'BEGIN PRIVATE KEY',
}

module.exports = config;

When tested on 44.14.3 (prior to the patch), you will see this is correctly redacted:

DEBUG: Platform config
       "platformConfig": {
         "hostType": "github",
         "endpoint": "https://api.github.com/",
         "isGHApp": false,
         "isGhe": false,
         "isGheCloud": false,
         "userDetails": {
           "username": "jamietanna",
           "name": "Jamie Tanna",
           "id": 3315059,
           "email": null
         },
         "userEmail": null
       },
       "renovateUsername": "**redacted**"

Notes

The fix applies redaction to httpsPrivateKey, httpsCertificate and httpsCertificateAuthority.

Even though httpsCertificate and httpsCertificateAuthority are generally "public" and "safe" to log, we are currently redacting them out of an abundance of caution, and are happy to discuss removing redaction.

Severity

High

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

CVE ID

No known CVE

Weaknesses

No CWEs

Credits